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Introduction
War is, alas, a constant in international affairs. A single look at the news 
reminds us daily of various conflicts and wars around the world, often per-
sisting for decades. On average, there are 14 UN peacekeeping operations 
in progress annually involving 110,000 people and around 50 other peace 
operations carried out by regional security organizations. War is never far 
away. In fact, cloaked in euphemistic labels such as peacekeeping, humani-
tarian interventions or stabilization operations, the West has been engaged 
in three decades of war since the ‘outbreak’ of peace on 9 November 1989 
(the fall of the Berlin Wall). While often stunningly successful  operationally, 
the West has also been repeatedly surprised by the complex operational 
 dynamics it encountered. Despite military superiority political strategic 
success has  often eluded Western military efforts. It struggled to  understand 
the  character of contemporary wars.
This chapter aims to explain this paradox, starting with a sketch of the re-
cent Western strategic history. It canvasses in Part II the variety of reasons 
explaining this strategic underperformance such as the denial of war result-
ing from a limited understanding of war and the prevailing European strate-
gic culture. Unfounded optimism in the application of new untested concepts 
and institutional amnesia in the armed forces also played a  significant role. 
In that, however, there is also a paradox as Part III shows; there has been 
no lack of scholarly interest in modern war often producing strategically 
relevant pointers that could have and perhaps should have informed strat-
egy and operational planning at the time. Part IV resolves the paradox of 
this disconnect. Western militaries have been confronted with an expand-
ing array of mission-types that governments could not have expected. Such 
defence policy fluidity and continued defence spending reductions, hamper 
organizational learning. Part V concludes with a retrospective mosaic of 
five images of contemporary war which serves as a warning for thinking 
about future war and defence policy. While many defence analysts harp on 
 uncertainty, the past three decades actually contain sufficient information 
to offer a rather sound and prudent perspective on what, as a minimum, 
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Western militaries can expect and should be prepared for so as to avoid 
another three decades of strategic underperformance.
Three decades of war: a brief strategic history in three parts
European and US armed forces have been deployed in roughly three dominant 
strategic contexts, which more or less coincide with three periods: 1990–2001, 
in which peacekeeping and peace enforcement were central, a period some-
times also referred to as the strategic pause; then 2001–2014, in which the recon-
struction of Afghanistan dominated military activities and  counter-terrorism 
became a regular military task; and 2014–2020 where the shock of the Islamic 
State (IS) and the new assertiveness of Russia forced a rethink.
1990–2001: peace operations in the Balkans
Almost immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, civil war broke out 
in Yugoslavia. The West reluctantly commenced a peace operation to keep 
the warring parties apart and to force a truce according to the then current 
classic Blue Helmet model. This model assumed it concerned a conflict be-
tween two states, both with a functioning government, that accepted the 
presence of the peace force which would retain strict neutrality and was only 
allowed to use force for self-defence.1 The Blue Helmets therefore had no 
heavy weapons and any escalation would depend on UN permission to call 
in air support from Operation Deny Flight. 2
These turned out to be incorrect assumptions. It was a civil war and 
the warring parties, Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, violated 
temporary truces when it suited them. There was no peace. So-called 
Safe Areas, a new and ad hoc concept introduced, proved to be extremely 
 vulnerable and Western politicians were not committed to actually defend 
these. When air support was requested by Blue Helmets and the UN after a 
long time threatened to carry out symbolic air strikes, UN observers were 
 frequently taken hostage as a counter-measure, immediately neutralizing 
the UN threat. Only after the horrors of Srebrenica did a willingness to 
move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement emerged.3
Similar vicious dynamics frustrated NATO in 1998–1999 when it became 
clear that Milosevic had no intent to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. After 
much diplomatic haggling, NATO countries reached consensus in March 
1999 to move to a robust humanitarian intervention in the form of an air 
 offensive, Operation Allied Force. At a tactical level, NATO’s profession-
alism and military superiority were beyond dispute. But the credibility of 
NATO and the severity of the attacks were unimpressive. The operation 
hesitantly started at a low intensity. Strategy was marred by disagreement 
among NATO member states about the types of targets to be attacked and 
whether escalation was necessary, and by common concern for risks to air-
crew and civilian casualties. The targets that were attacked had little  actual 
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political weight with Milosevic. Only when the credibility of NATO itself 
came into question did political willingness coalesce to escalate,  attack 
more strategically relevant targets, and sustain the operation until Milose-
vic showed willingness to withdraw his troops from Kosovo.4
2001–2014: reconstruction of Afghanistan and COIN
In retrospect, the 1990s were just a strategic ‘pause’.5 The horrific attacks 
on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 shattered the 
illusion of security in the West. Where the US proclaimed the global war 
on terror, Europe preferred statebuilding as a strategic military response, 
 arguing fundamentalist groups found sanctuary in weak and failing states.6 
This liberal statebuilding model, based on Western societies, aspired to 
create a ring of ‘well governed’ countries around Europe through the im-
plementation of the rule of law, an effective and representative democratic 
political system, and the restoration of the security and economy in war torn 
countries. It called for a joint or ‘comprehensive approach’: the contribution 
of and cooperation between military units and other governmental organi-
zations and NGOs.
Statebuilding activities, however, got off to a slow start in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was able to quickly fill the re-
sulting security gap when it became clear that the international force was 
far too small to exert influence all over Afghanistan. Statebuilding requires 
security but the increasing threat of Improvised Explosive Devices and 
 ambushes necessitated prioritizing protection of own troops and fighting an 
assortment of irregular fighters. While successful on a tactical level, these 
actions also slowed down the pace of reconstruction activities. From 2007 
it had to be recognized that NATO faced an insurgency. The answer was a 
rediscovery of counterinsurgency (COIN), a combat mission, an unwelcome 
message for politicians in Germany and the Netherlands, for example, and a 
task Western armed forces were unprepared for: knowledge and expertise in 
irregular warfare were lacking. Fighting such adaptive opponents was also 
extremely complex due to the many restrictions imposed on Western units 
regarding the use of force.7 The mission ended in 2014. Afghanistan is still 
not stable, witness the frequent bomb attacks there.
2014: Russia and the rediscovery of collective defence
That year followed a geopolitical shock, the annexation of Crimea by 
 Russia. It was a watershed moment.8 In 2010, the NATO Strategic  Concept 
considered interstate threats near the NATO treaty area very unlikely. Yet, 
from 2014, the new rivalry with an assertive Russia became the central 
 strategic problem again presenting Europe with three strategic challenges: 
(1) hybrid warfare, (2) the rediscovery of conventional deterrence and (3) the 
 rediscovery of nuclear strategy.
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Hybrid warfare, the Western label for Russian actions during the 
 annexation of Crimea, refers to the orchestrated deployment of subversive 
 activities, psychological warfare, media manipulation, deception activities, 
cyberattacks and intimidation of politicians. It aims to exert influence with-
out applying overt military force, remaining deliberately below the thresh-
old of violence of the Western concept of war. It is the zone between peace 
and war. While a time-honoured stratagem, the West had lost sight of it 
and was also surprised by the impressive military modernization of fighters, 
tanks, anti-aircraft systems, and surface-to-surface missiles, cyber capabili-
ties and electronic warfare assets coupled with demonstrations of large-scale 
exercises – ‘snap exercises’ – in which sometimes more than 100,000 troops 
moved quickly over strategic distances, presenting an intimidating threat to 
Eastern European NATO member states. The shock was reinforced by the 
recognition that the credibility of the conventional deterrence of the West, 
and thus the collective security concept of NATO, was in doubt as Europe 
had long lost capabilities and expertise for high intensity warfare. This also 
applied to the nuclear dimension.9 While Russia is prepared for a (limited) 
nuclear war in Europe there has hardly been any discourse about nuclear 
deterrence since 1990. As more than one report concluded, NATO does not 
have an adequate response to a Russian escalation, a sobering observation 
for the Baltic States.10
If we accept that the three decades of war started with George Bush’s 
call for striving towards a new and liberal world order in 1990, subsequent 
 interventions, while motivated by laudable humanitarian concerns, can be 
considered wars for expansion and maintenance of the liberal world or-
der. Undeniably, the three decades’ war saw remarkable tactical military 
 performances, innovative operational concepts, demonstrations of military 
superiority and an unprecedented ability to reduce the risk not only for 
Western military personnel but also that of civilian casualties and collateral 
damage. Moreover, peacekeeping operations generally did alleviate human 
suffering, after a while and for a while (many wars have flared up after initial 
peacekeeping success). However, while toppling authoritarian regimes was 
achieved at remarkable low costs, the aftermaths of such societal upheaval 
in Iraq and Libya has proven to be catastrophic for the people and the wider 
region. And interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been very costly in 
financial terms and in lives lost, and have not produced the long-term stabil-
ity and societal transformation so desired. At the dawn of the third decade 
of the 21st Century, one must conclude that the Western use of military force 
underperformed strategically.
Explaining the strategic underperformance
Many explanations for these military-strategic problems have been 
advanced. First, the exceptional strategic culture that prevailed within 
Western European societies. The military instrument had lost its value and 
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legitimacy, and, as John Mueller argued, by 1989 major war had become 
sub-rationally unthinkable in the West. Soft power – the positive effect of 
globalization, liberalism, international treaties and organizations – was 
considered more important in the future than hard power. Europe was safe. 
Only humanitarian operations justified investment in defence.11 Instead 
of war, these were labelled with terms such as peacekeeping  operations, 
 training missions, reconstruction missions, or humanitarian interventions, 
even though the actual operational dynamics no longer matched these 
 euphemistic labels. War had ‘disappeared’ from the societal frame of refer-
ence.12 ‘Europe lives on Venus, America on Mars’, argued Robert Kagan in 
his acclaimed book Of Paradise and Power, raising a warning finger towards 
Europe.13
This was an optimistic denial of history indeed and also removed under-
standing of the strategic logic of the vicious dynamics in which military 
units entered, and of what Western military units were actually concerned 
with. And that was waging war in the famous Clausewitzian sense: trying 
to impose the will on an opponent by military means. Europe’s limited view 
became apparent in the Balkans and Rwanda, for instance, where ethnic 
cleansing, political massacres and rapes as a barbaric by-product were not 
recognized as integral parts of a targeted warfighting strategy of the war-
ring parties. The limited legalistic Western perspective on what war is, when 
and how it can be waged, by whom and against whom, also blinded many 
in 2014 during the annexation of Crimea: there was no clash between two 
armies and hence did not resemble the paradigmatic image of war.
A second factor concerns risk aversion: a central feature of Western 
 strategic culture is the almost obsessive concern about risks to military 
 personnel, but especially for collateral damage and civilian casualties. This 
is partly because the use of precision weapons in various missions man-
aged to limit these risks to a historically unprecedented low level which as a 
 result became the political and ethical norm and expectation. This in itself 
is a valuable development. Christopher Coker called the Western way of 
war ‘Humane Warfare’, because it was accompanied by an unprecedented 
respect for the law of armed conflict and because the West only waged war 
over humanitarian interests, or at least could justify an intervention in that 
way. However, if civilian casualties were to be regretted, this could lead to 
critical media and political questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of the operation. Such sensitivity to risks translated into stringent restric-
tions on the use of force during missions and often an unrealistic emphasis 
on protecting both forces and civilians.14 Opponents of all kinds, such as 
Karadzic, Saddam Hussein, Mullah Omar, and Gaddafi, have exploited this 
sensitivity to the full.
A third factor might be termed strategic fuzziness, namely the denial of 
war has also been accompanied by neglect of the associated strategic frame 
of reference, resulting in virtual strategic illiteracy and a decline of strat-
egy.15 Basic principles of military strategic thinking have frequently been 
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ignored or, in any case, have been less prevalent over other considerations. 
For example, during Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, not 
strategy dictated the plan of attack, but a list of targets that NATO member 
states could agree on after a consensus seeking political process regardless 
whether these actually represented politically relevant coercive value.16 In 
Afghanistan there was no strategy.17 Fighting the Taliban, itself a necessary 
tactical activity, filled the gap, Hew Strachan concluded.18 This also applied 
to the concept of the Comprehensive Approach, the 3D approach which 
took the place of strategy, but was merely an inward-looking organizational 
concept that had never really proven itself and faltered in implementation 
because the participating non-military organizations did not necessarily 
have the same objectives or level of commitment, nor sufficient capabili-
ties, nor the willingness to align their activities with military units.19 As 
 during the various Balkan crises, lack of unity among Western states also 
affected Operation Unified Protector in 2011 and mounted a serious coher-
ent  response towards Russia in 2014.
Fourth, missions often featured ill-defined objectives and mission creep; 
the mission increased in size, aims and complexity. In the Balkans, Blue 
 Helmets had to initially observe truces, escort convoys, then contain 
 violence, and guard (but not protect) safe areas and, eventually, to force the 
leaders of the warring parties to the negotiating table. Exactly what success 
entailed was not always evident or measurable with common  military cri-
teria. The utility of force, Rupert Smith argued, is no longer about  winning 
a victory but creating a condition in which a political solution can be 
sought.20 While true, that offers little guidance to military personnel. In 
Afghanistan and Iraq, ISAF pursued ‘maximalist’ objectives: the complete 
redesign and reconstruction of a neo-patrimonial conservative and politi-
cally corrupt society that was not Western-oriented and had no tradition 
of effective state administration according to Western democratic model. 
Diligent efforts were made to find criteria that could provide insight into the 
stability of a country, improving the legal system or setting up an account-
able  governmental structure but how do you measure success if the objec-
tive is to rebuild an entire society or a province?21 Moreover, the objectives 
could differ between contributing member states.22 Merely participating in 
the mission was the primary political goal for many countries. Finally, the 
resources made available were often not in line with the objective, size and 
complexity of a mission. In the Balkans, the UN never got the 36,000 blue 
helmets needed in the first few years. In Afghanistan it proved difficult to 
generate sufficient international contributions. COIN and statebuilding 
missions require a large force and a long breath. Even when ISAF was  finally 
130,000 strong, this proved insufficient for such a large area against a tena-
cious and tough Taliban.23 ‘Unwinnable’ as Theo Farrell titled his study on 
the British deployment in Afghanistan.24
Finally, misperceptions, knowledge gaps and institutional amnesia have 
been important strategic problems. First, the planning of the initial peace 
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operations in the Balkans erroneously assumed that the civil wars there had 
strong similarities to previous conflicts in which classical peace operations 
were conducted. Second, the armed forces and academic institutions had 
little knowledge of the nature of these civil wars, their motives, their  origins 
and the logic of violence employed by warring parties. Third, there was 
hardly any knowledge about the dynamics of coercive diplomacy: the ques-
tion of how, with limited resources, one can credibly impose one’s will on 
an opponent and force it to make concessions or stop its actions. Fourth, an 
unfounded optimism about the success of sometimes still untested strategic 
concepts. The mission in Afghanistan was undertaken without empirical 
evidence to support the idea that the liberal statebuilding model could be 
successfully implemented in a fragmented non-Western country.25 Finally, 
institutional amnesia: knowledge and expertise had been lost on counterin-
surgency, and, as became evident in 2014 in many European states, also on 
high intensity interstate warfare, including nuclear deterrence. 
The paradox: a vibrant study of war
The paradox is that there was no shortage of growing insights into strategic 
issues. Indeed, the study of war flourished, precisely because of the strategic 
and operational problems that Western armed forces encountered, as a brief 
and selective sketch of the intellectual landscape will show. Desert Storm in-
spired a heated debate about the significance of it for the future of Western 
warfare.26 One camp argued a Revolution in Military Affairs was taking 
shape. New precision weapons, stealth fighters, cruise missiles, electronic 
warfare systems, new sensor platforms, all connected by data links, yielded 
an unprecedentedly effective force capable of defeating Iraq (the world’s 
fourth army at the time) without incurring major losses. These new tech-
nologies led to new operational concepts such as Network Centric Warfare 
and, what has come to be called, the New American Way of War: the use of 
precision weapons, optimal use of air superiority and, if possible, avoiding 
ground troops in direct combat with the opponent.
In academic circles, these new technologies and the Balkan challenges led 
to a rediscovery of the theory of coercive diplomacy and deterrence.27 How 
can a leader like Milosevic be forced to accept the demands of the West with 
only limited use of military force? What political preconditions should be 
kept in mind? Which target complexes should be threatened or attacked, 
and how intensively, to exert effective political pressure? What new strategic 
opportunities did precision weapons offer? And above all, what explained 
the failures of Western conventional deterrence?28
European analysts doubted Desert Storm’s relevance because such a war 
no longer seemed likely. Studies instead focused on the role of violence in 
peace operations and the limits of the classic Blue Helmets model, leading 
to suggestions for ‘wider peacekeeping’ and ‘robust peacekeeping’ and,  after 
the horrors of Srebrenica and Rwanda, to the development of the peace 
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enforcement concept.29 Critical studies examined to what extent humani-
tarian interventions could actually end civil wars arguing that controlling 
violence often seems feasible, provided that UN troops remain in a conflict 
region for a long time. Tackling the root causes hardly appeared possible. 
Others advocated intensifying humanitarian interventions. Sovereignty 
should no longer be an obstacle to intervene when a regime oppresses its 
own population.30
Other studies focused on the nature of the civil wars, arguing these were 
‘New Wars’ that could not be understood from the Western instrumental 
strategic perspective. New types of warlords were not seeking peace; they 
exist in a mutual parasitic-symbiotic relationship to continue the local war 
in order for each to maintain their position of power. War is an end in itself 
and peace is not desirable. Others discussed whether ‘old hatreds’ were the 
causes, or economic deprivation. A third category pointed to the instrumen-
tal role that ethnicity, religion and nationalism play in civil wars demon-
strating how leaders can mobilize religion, ethnicity, myths and symbols to 
create enemy images and gradually legitimize extreme violence against ‘the 
other’. For those who participated, the war gave meaning to their existence, 
turning war into an existential experience and not an instrumental one.31
The horrific attacks of 9/11 inspired a wealth of studies on the apparent 
new form of catastrophic terrorism, on radicalization processes, the logic of 
suicide bombings and the role of religion.32 Here, too, studies on Al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, Hezbollah and more recently IS show that the Western instru-
mental perspective on war may partly explain the behaviour of such groups, 
but also that it is a limited and culturally determined one. The 9/11 attacks, 
Jurgensmeyer concluded, were the manifestation of an everlasting ‘cosmic’ 
metaphysical and existential religious battle, or so the perpetrators of the 
attacks experienced it.33
The Second Lebanon War of 2006, a rude awakening for Israel, also 
showed the limitations of the traditional categorization of types of wars 
used by Western academics and military personnel. Hezbollah, a terror-
ist movement, now featured an arsenal of medium to long range missiles, 
weapons traditionally not associated with terrorist organizations, and ap-
plied tactics of different types of warfare: standard guerrilla tactics but also 
 positional defence of villages, whereby Hezbollah managed to take out Is-
raeli tanks. This mix of terrorist tactics, guerrilla type actions and  regular 
army operations, combined with a sophisticated media organization, in-
spired Frank Hoffman to call it Hybrid Conflict, drawing attention to this 
category-breaking aspect.34
Strategic narratives and so-called ‘Virtual War’ – the use of internet and 
social media – had now become an obvious key front. Hezbollah claimed 
victory over Israel, not because of military success, but through a targeted 
media campaign. Elsewhere groups such as the Al-Qaeda, Taliban and IS 
also boosted the perception of their power through showing social media 
images of suicide bombers, horrific killings and ambushes on Western troop 
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patrols, all of which were carried out, not because of their immediate  tactical 
military effects, but rather to produce propaganda material.35 By promoting 
sensational media images, terrorist groups capitalized on the ‘power of fail-
ure’: even if attacks missed their primary target they proved they still existed 
and the government was failing in its counter-terrorist strategy. In response, 
a flurry of studies and new doctrines suggested counters to such narratives 
or ways to employ them proactively.36
Right from the start of the mission in Afghanistan there was an intense 
 discussion about the validity of the liberal statebuilding model and its 
 strategic value, with most analysts agreeing that its core assumptions were 
flawed and building local institutions and bodies that have local legitimacy 
should take priority, even if they are based on norms and values that are 
diametrically opposed to those of the West.37 Meanwhile, in response to the 
strategic and operational problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, classical works 
on counterinsurgencies were reviewed for their current relevance. Tradi-
tional concepts such as hearts and minds campaigns, and clear-hold-build 
were rediscovered, but also criticized as contemporary insurgencies differed 
greatly from the groups on which the classical COIN theorists based their 
work. Insurgents are no longer necessarily intent on taking over the state and 
no longer was there a dichotomy of a state against one insurgent.  Instead, 
insurgent and terrorist movements are not monolithic organizations and 
within such movements several groups may compete with one another.38
The problems with counterinsurgency inspired studies into alternatives 
that could offer a ‘low footprint-low risk’ solution. Counterinsurgency, 
like statebuilding, is personnel-intensive, requires long-term commitment 
and is highly dependent on the quality and legitimacy of the host nation’s 
 government. Moreover, it potentially leads to a significant number of 
 casualties among Western military personnel and they are rarely success-
ful.39 The success of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 in which the 
 Taliban was ousted by the combination of special forces, air power and lo-
cal rebels, or proxies, brought proxy warfare into the spotlight. This model 
has since also been used successfully applied against Gaddafi in 2011 and 
IS in Iraq yet also critically reviewed as it leaves the fight to the proxy and 
success depends on to what extent and for how long the interests, objectives, 
stamina and risk assessments of the Western coalition match those of the 
proxy forces.40
A second alternative was presented by armed Unmanned Aerial Vehi-
cles (UAVs). Drones allow prolonged surveillance of members of terror 
 movements and insurgents and engage them in so-called targeted killing 
 actions. Beyond the immediate destructive effects, this may also serve as a 
deterrent. However, fierce critique argued this practice constituted illegiti-
mate  ‘extra-judicial killing’ and would lead to the casual use of force because 
it entailed few risks politically. Moreover, a PlayStation mentality was ex-
pected: a drone attack might look like a video game for young drone pilots. 
War then becomes surreal and moral disengagement and dehumanization 
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occur, explaining, according to critics, the apparently large number of 
 civilian casualties. Subsequent empirical studies demonstrated that many 
of the initial concerns and criticisms were unjustified. The Red Cross even 
 concluded that carefully deployed drones made it possible in principle to 
better follow the rules of humanitarian war law than with manned aircraft.41
Finally, Cyberwarfare. This became a dominant topic after the Russian 
cyberattack on Estonia in 2007, the increasing Chinese cyber activity and the 
Stuxnet attack on Iran in 2012. Early studies contrasted cyberattack char-
acteristics with those of traditional kinetic attacks with high tech  weapons, 
suggesting cyber weapons are available to all kinds of non-state actors; they 
are most likely ‘one-shot’ weapons (once used, a defence will be developed 
quickly) and that effects of cyberattacks are transient. Whether cyberattacks 
can have strategic effects and whether they can play a role as a deterrent are 
an ongoing debate. At the same time, cyber warfare will lead to a substantial 
power shift and a potential threat to the international legal  order (see also 
Chapters 13 and 14).42 Another strand of inquiry questioned to what extent 
the existing framework of international and humanitarian law of war is suffi-
cient for cyber warfare, while Thomas Rid challenged whether  cyberattacks 
can be considered war in the Clausewitzian sense at all.
Understanding the paradox of strategic underperformance
There is a remarkable paradox: on the one hand problems that can partly be 
traced back to lacunae in the strategic frame of reference, while on the other 
hand a parallel blossoming of the study of war producing strategically rele-
vant insights that could and perhaps should have been a source of  influence 
during policy and strategy developments at the time. This  paradox has 
an almost trivial explanation. Thorough academic work takes time and is 
therefore inevitably reactive. It took several years to rediscover and  update 
knowledge about coercive diplomacy. Revision of peacekeeping doctrines 
also took years, including the trauma of Srebrenica and Rwanda and the 
subsequent crisis in UN peacekeeping operations, in which the West was 
reluctant to set up or participate in UN operations. It also takes a long time 
for these kinds of new insights to be incorporated into military doctrines, 
UN manuals, new curricula in university education programs and military 
courses. It then remains to be seen whether such knowledge can also influ-
ence a strategic decision-making process in time.
Studies on institutionalization processes, learning processes and  military 
innovation also suggest that the dissemination and embedding of new 
 insights, doctrines and practices does not always proceed quickly in armed 
forces, with their strong identity and organizational culture, and their 
 inherent conservative nature regarding ideas that may not yet have demon-
strated their merits in practice.43 Moreover, narrow organizational interests 
and inter-service rivalry, service-specific ongoing investment programs and 
national political priorities can all act as a filter, downplaying analyses and 
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lessons learned that are perhaps not irrelevant but not in the interest from a 
specific service’s perspective which is in the middle of a fight for shrinking 
budgets. Moreover, it can be argued that the most recent war is a unique 
and one-off case (the fallacy of the significant exception), or that a particu-
lar case will not often reoccur for a particular country. Analyses are thus 
politicized.44
Furthermore, during operations deployed units were forced to engage 
in continuous and rapid adaptation processes to respond to the tactical 
situation on the ground which invariably proved different from the initial 
military and political assessments. This could result in new tactics, rapid 
introduction of new equipment or requests to adjust Rules of Engagement.45 
Units passed on painful experiences, often through informal learning and 
communication processes. In a force with institutional lessons learned 
 processes and associated organizations such as in the United States (and 
to some extent also in the United Kingdom), this resulted, with some de-
lay, in excellent new doctrines.46 However, understandably, in the context 
of  ongoing tensions among defence organizations, the institutionalization – 
internalization – of lessons learned in units has often been problematic, or 
has been neglected, certainly if no formalized learning processes existed, 
which was the case in most European armed forces.47
An additional factor has been the fluidity of defence policy and the 
 subsequent rapid pace of change that the armed forces have had to respond to 
since 1990. The geopolitical scope of their efforts and the variety of  mission 
types only increased. From fully educated in, trained and equipped for Air-
Land Battle, Follow-on-Forces-Attack and joint warfare in which infantry, 
armour, artillery and fighter aircraft would coordinate to combat the Red 
Enemy, to the unarmed Blue Helmet UN missions to keep peace that was 
not there. From the German plains to African zones of turmoil to  alleviate 
humanitarian needs, from the Atlantic to intercept Russian submarines to 
combat piracy in the Indian Ocean, to Afghanistan to rebuild the country 
and suppress a vicious insurgency. And, having just returned from Afghan-
istan and the skies over Libya and Iraq, it turned out that units had to pre-
pare again for large-scale warfare, including nuclear deterrence. This is just 
a sampling of the high tempo and scope of strategic and  operational changes 
that Western armed forces have faced, amid ongoing austerity, force reduc-
tions, the closure of barracks, headquarters and air bases. After one type of 
mission or conflict a different type of mission demanded the attention of the 
same units, with the other type requiring substantially different expertise. 
That happened in 1990, in 2001 and reoccurred in 2014: now the demand 
for expertise, training and exercise for COIN missions with a focus on a 
comprehensive and population centric approach, and non-kinetic influence 
methods, is less pressing for most European armed forces than regaining 
expertise in waging large-scale enemy-centric combat.
This has a direct influence on the question which knowledge and expertise 
will be institutionalized and updated. Moreover, many European member 
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states do not have a national operational headquarter where military strat-
egy is developed; that theme has de facto mostly been delegated to NATO. 
In various countries there is also no intensive contact between the theoret-
ical academic world, the ministries of defence and foreign affairs and the 
‘operators’ within the armed forces. And sometimes, Elliott noticed, those 
communities talk in different languages; they are separate epistemological 
communities.48 While these differences are to be expected, the danger lurks 
of institutional isolationism and institutional amnesia is then to be  expected: 
every organization views the strategic problems from its own  limited per-
spective and from its own organization-specific rationality.
The shadow of the past
While in light of these factors criticism of Western politicians and military 
commanders must be nuanced, the costly insights and traumas of the three 
decades of war should not go unheeded as they aided our understanding of 
contemporary war. Whereas up to 2014, it could be argued that real  security 
risks were far away, Europe, and the West is once again confronted with and 
surprised by tragic security policy developments nearby: strategic competi-
tion, an assertive Russia, the rise of nationalist, right-wing extremist groups 
and authoritarian governments, all of which risk undermining cohesion 
within the EU and NATO. At the same time, there is little to suggest that the 
situation in the Arc of Instability will change substantially and positively in 
the coming years.49 In that sense the three decades of war offer sufficient in-
formation to provide a plausible image of the future Westerns governments 
and their militaries should be prepared for.50 The future is less uncertain 
than generally believed to be, or, as Nicholas Taleb stated provocatively, 
the future is here, the most important parts of it were made long ago.51 It 
suggests that the variety of types of war and modes of warfare encountered 
during the past 30 years and captured in the following five images will prob-
ably offer a minimum baseline for thinking about the conduct of war in the 
next decade.
One dominant school of thought sees continuity with wars revolving 
around vicious actions of violent non-state actors such as IS and criminal 
organizations, while the distinction between the type of actor is actually 
meaningless. Sometimes ethnicity or religion is a driver for the struggle, 
but often it goes hand in hand with the pursuit of economic profit. Their 
battlefield is increasingly the city, an environment in which it is difficult 
for Western soldiers to operate.52 There will be ‘durable disorder’. This 
harps back to van Creveld’s 1989 book The Transformation of War, Kaldor’s 
New Wars thesis from the 1990s and Hoffman’s Hybrid Conflict concept 
from 2007. According to McFate, these groups will increasingly be able to 
 inflict damage upon Western countries via cyberattacks, corruption and 
the use of drones.53 They can easily organize themselves into ‘smart mobs’ 
via social media. With their barbaric tactics, they will be able to intimidate 
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populations, echoing past visions of the future that warn of expanding an-
archism in much of the world.54
Mary Kaldor argued, in light of the above, that Western states must 
be prepared for intra-state wars, humanitarian crises and corresponding 
 humanitarian operations. Indeed, most analysts expect humanitarian cri-
ses to increase in number. Coining this image the ‘liberal peace security 
 culture’, she associates it with effective international organizations such as 
the OSCE, the EU and the UN. Continuing on the laudable ideals of the 
1990s and the concept of Human Security, this cosmopolitan vision sees 
a future in which wars in failing and fragile states must be resolved and 
 violence curtailed through peacekeeping operations to alleviate humanitar-
ian suffering. To this end, Western armed forces must act de facto as cosmo-
politan police units that provide security and stability in villages in order to 
create space in which to start a peaceful political process.
The third image disagrees with Kaldor, arguing that the future, like the 
past, is irregular, and militaries will deploy predominantly in a counter-
insurgency role, in a multitude of protracted conflicts in unstable regions, 
using mainly special forces, training of proxy forces, sophisticated surveil-
lance systems capable of long-term observation of areas and armed drones if 
necessary to perform a precision strike on a few individuals.55 The ambition 
is not so much to defeat the insurgents or terrorist movements as to curb the 
risks these groups can present for increasing regional destabilization and/or 
as a direct threat to Western societies. In that it continues on the Global War 
on Terror, the so-called Long War, and US operations ongoing in several 
African countries as well as against IS.56 ‘Surrogate Warfare’, according to 
Krieg and Rickli: the West tries to exert influence with high technology and 
minimal physical presence and therefore political risk in conflict areas.57 
War as risk management indeed, and certainly immaculate.
The fourth image concerns the renewed geopolitical rivalry between the 
United States (with Europe at hand), Russia and China. The concept of 
 hybrid threats has recently been supplemented with terms such as ‘new total 
warfare’, ‘political warfare’ and ‘gray zone warfare’.58 All of these  suggest 
that strategic competition should be viewed as war, in the sense that, just 
as during the Cold War, strategy concerns a wide range of instruments and 
 activities in various military and especially non-military domains, and 
second, that in the application of those instruments it can affect various 
sections of Western societies. Defence requires a so-called whole of society 
approach to guard against continuous use of non-kinetic actions intent to 
exert influence such as economic espionage through cyberattacks, economic 
sanctions and financial warfare, bribery and intimidation of politicians (and 
liquidation through poisoning if necessary), and financing of militant  anti- 
European political groups in democratic states and even providing these 
groups with weapons.59 But it is also about gaining influence through ‘cool’ 
social media, including the distribution of fake news.60 Hackers, troll armies, 
tech companies, media organizations, banks, research centres, academic 
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institutions and energy suppliers all are actors in this strategic competition. 
War and peace, concepts categorically distinguished in the West, overlap.61
Finally, contradicting John Mueller, echoing the events since 2014,  various 
authors see a return of large-scale conflict in addition to the ‘Cool War’ just 
outlined. War in the classical sense, like an armed conflict between two large 
countries, is no longer considered impossible and less improbable than, for 
example, in 1999. The damping effect of international institutions is steadily 
diminishing and the need for authoritarian regimes to pursue aggressive 
foreign policies for national purposes is increasing, as is their capacity for 
offensive actions. Small-scale ‘probes’ are expected which will not justify 
a collective armed response from the West, yet slowly aim to change the 
status quo and undermine the power position of the West (especially the 
United States) and test the willingness to commit to serious reprisals. New 
technologies will be used such as hypersonic missiles, swarms of drones and 
killer robots. AI will analyse large amounts of data from large numbers of 
networked commercial and military sensors and satellites.62 All enhance 
the risk of escalation.63 This vision reflects the ongoing shift in the balance 
of power, something the COVID-19 crisis is expected to accelerate, with a 
declining influence of the United States, and thus of the West. The liberal 
world order is subject to erosion and liberal Western ideas are under discus-
sion, in both non-Western and various Western countries.64 This is not a 
return to the Cold War, because unlike that period, actors are now actively 
seeking to disrupt stability. We will enter an interregnum in which ideology 
will once again play an important role. Fukuyama has been discredited: 
there is in fact a competitor for Western liberalism: authoritarianism. The 
question is which international order will win this competition.65
Conclusion: strategic history and the multiple faces of war
Like the past, the future of war is plural and defence policy based on just 
one particular future scenario is irresponsible.66 As Clausewitz famously ar-
gued, war is a many-headed and changeable phenomenon, like a  chameleon. 
In retrospect the West has, arguably, not taken this to heart sufficiently. 
Not all futures are equally relevant for all countries of course. The future 
of war looks partly different for the Europeans than for the United States. 
Yet, if strategic surveys combined with what we know of the past three dec-
ades may serve as guidepost, for many Western states the strategic pan-
orama holds a future in which they will continue to be forced to act in a 
context of sophisticated barbarism, launching peacekeeping operations to 
resolve humanitarian emergencies, and do so while limiting political risk 
as much as possible by relying partly on proxies. At the same time, it will 
have to be alert and proactive in the context of the Cool War, which is part 
of a strategic competition that also takes place on European territory which 
also demands taking seriously again the risk of major war and to enhance 
 conventional and nuclear deterrence credibility.
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War must regrettably be put back into the Western societal discourse, 
not to casually consider it as a normal feature of international affairs and 
wage it with a degree of indifference, but to regain the frame of reference so 
that we can understand this tragic phenomenon in all its facets and deploy 
the military instrument strategically, if necessary. Perhaps the intellectual 
father of War Studies, Sir Michael Howard, was right when he wrote in 2000 
that war is the norm while peace is a recent fragile invention and a historical 
exception.67 War, alas, like in the past, has a bright future.
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